Refinement, replacement and reduction of animals in research has become a guiding principle for legislation governing animal research, and for the implementation of that legislation. However, one of these '3Rs', replacement, would seem incompatible with the science of animal behaviour, where the animal is not a model for the human condition, but the object of interest itself. This, the power of biomedical research and the pharmaceutical industry as lobbying groups, and the fact that the public could come to equate 'animal research' with vivisection, should cause concern in the animal behaviour community. The dominance of the 3Rs, and the evaluation of the utility of animal research in terms of medical benefits, could come to dominate ethical decisions about animal research. I argue that the 3Rs are not as incompatible with the aims of animal behaviour as it first appears, and that their principles can be readily incorporated into our research, but this must be twinned with a greater commitment to dialogue with legislative bodies and biomedical lobbying groups, to ensure that the utility of animal research is not evaluated solely in terms of medical and other immediate human gains.
To many ethologists and behavioural ecologists, the debate over animal experimentation is one that takes place in another domain, with legislators seeking a difficult balance between a politicized animal rights movement and the might of the biomedicalepharmaceutical industry. Sometimes the Law and its accompanying bureaucracy must be faced, for example when mildly invasive procedures such as blood sampling are required, but the majority of studies that are published in journals such as Animal Behaviour involve procedures that slip below the threshold at which a legally binding document is required to sanction the research. However, because political, public and legal debate centres on licensed research, there are genuine fears that changes in legislation (or, importantly, the way legislation is interpreted) will have an unintended negative impact on the study of animal behaviour (Barnard 2007) . In other words, animal behaviour will become a, largely unnoticed, casualty of laws seeking a compromise between the needs of biomedical research and the public response to an opposing animal rights movement. An example of this would appear to be that replacement (of animals in research) is stated as the ultimate aim of the body set up by the U.K. government to oversee and promote laboratory animal welfare research: the National Centre for the Refinement, Replacement and Reduction of Animals in Research (NC3Rs; http:// www.nc3rs.org.uk/page.asp?id¼4; the 3Rs themselves having been adopted from Russell & Burch's 1959 classic text). This message is broadcast not only to a narrow audience of scientists and government agencies, but also to schoolchildren (e.g. Robinson 2005, page 2), and so could shape the views of the next generation of voters. To students of animal behaviour, however, nonhuman animals (henceforth 'animals') are not convenient model systems (for the study of human function) that can be replaced; they are the objects of study. The purpose of my article is to argue that the guiding principles of the 3Rs are not so incompatible with the aims of animal behaviour research as they at first appear. Furthermore, although animal behaviour does have a special role in informing the debate (Mason & Mendl 1993; Dawkins 1998 Dawkins , 2003  
